Sidgwick, the exercise of a mysterious 'I', the basis of formed ethical will, is what most clearly distinguishes humans from other species, but this was a distinction that evolutionary thinking was rendering increasingly fragile. For Darwin in the Descent, ethical or socially responsible behaviour is the product of evolutionary forces, and not an instance of the special human privileges and burdens endowed by a divine creator. But this biological account raised its own problems in relation to a modern yearning for freedom and self-fulfilment that was particularly sharply felt by women seeking to transform traditional gendered expectations about their lives. It is in novels that this tension is most tellingly explored.
and evolutionary biology, proved to be one of the most potent domains for transformations associated with secularization. The classification and study of 'emotions', for example, began to replace older, and Christian connoted, concepts of passions and affections. 5 The philosopher Henry Sidgwick, writing in 1874, declared that scientific method was rolling back uncertainty in all 'departments of facts': 'conflicting modes of thought have receded and faded, until at length they have vanished everywhere, except for the mysterious citadel of the will.' 6 For some, like
Sidgwick, the exercise of a mysterious 'I', the basis of formed ethical will, is what most clearly distinguishes humans from other species, but this was a distinction that evolutionary thinking was rendering increasingly fragile. For Darwin in the Descent, ethical or socially responsible behaviour is the product of evolutionary forces, and not an instance of the special human privileges and burdens endowed by a divine creator. But this biological account raised its own problems in relation to a modern yearning for freedom and self-fulfilment that was particularly sharply felt by women seeking to transform traditional gendered expectations about their lives. It is in novels that this tension is most tellingly explored.
From the 1870s on, Sidgwick's 'mysterious' human will and the moral capacities with which it is associated came under direct attack from the new physiological understanding of mind.
Volitional consciousness itself came to be seen as a metaphysical fiction in theories which threatened to collapse long-held assumptions about self and consciousness, motive and action.
Delivering the Gifford lectures in Aberdeen between 1896 and 1898, the philosopher and psychologist James Ward characterised scientific naturalism as the union of three fundamental theories: the first two assert that nature is ultimately resolvable into a single vast mechanism and that evolution describes the functioning of this mechanism; the third is the 'theory of psychophysical parallelism or conscious automatism, according to which theory mental phenomena occasionally accompany but never determine the movements and interactions of the material world.' 7 One famous exponent of this latter plank of scientific naturalism was Thomas Henry Huxley who in 1874 published in the Fortnightly Review his essay 'On the Hypothesis that Animals are Automata, and its History'. In it, he argues that consciousness is merely a noncausal accompaniment to physiological life: the conscious mind is the steam whistle which announces, but does not drive, the locomotive engine of the brain. 8 Darwin, on reading the article when it was later reprinted, wrote to John Collier: 'That on automatism is wonderfully interesting, more is the pity, say I, for if I were as well armed as Huxley I would challenge him to a duel on this subject. But I am a deal too wise to do anything of the kind, for he would run me through the body half a dozen times with his sharp and polished rapier before I knew where I was.' 9 The duel was fought many times amongst others, however, over the profound implications of automatism theory for cherished notions of the human, of free will, and the liberal subject.
Implicitly and explicitly these scientific debates could not fail to be important for women novelists exploring narratives of sexual choice in the period, as they sought to understand the ethical implications of courtship for middle-class women and to imagine new forms of female agency and autonomy. After all, at its most explicit, the evolutionary account of sexual selection told by Darwin appeared to offer women a very limited set of imaginative possibilities. In the Descent evolutionary biology seems all too readily to mirror middle-class Victorian gender stereotype: 'Man is more courageous, pugnacious and energetic than woman, and has a more inventive genius', while woman displays 'greater tenderness and less selfishness… owing to her maternal instincts'. 10 As a result, female commentators from the period, and feminist scholars subsequently, have viewed Darwin's work, and sometimes late nineteenth-century biological science as such, as largely hostile to women's egalitarian aspirations. 11 But few thoughtful commentators see Darwin's influence as straightforward. Recently, for example, the literary Darwinian scholar , George Levine, has sought to retrieve the 'fertile and disruptive' potential of Darwin's theory of sexual selection, arguing that Darwin's theory works counter to the cultural forces which produced it by ushering intention back into the evolutionary world. This is not intention on the grand plan of natural theology's divine originator, but is rather the result of the agency practiced by females in their sexual choosing. 12 Certainly it is true that over-hasty assessments of the impact of evolutionary and scientific ideas risk not only misunderstanding Darwin's influence, but also misreading the complex lines of influence running between literary and scientific writing in the period. 13 Thus Ruth Bernard Yeazell, in her study of courtship in the novel, is rightly convinced that the 'modern understanding of the natural' which functioned to secure so much of the codification of female modest behaviour in the nineteenth century 'owes at least something' to the work of novelists. 14 In the remainder of this essay, I look at how increasingly authoritative scientific accounts of human motive and behaviour affected two women novelists, George Eliot and Olive Schreiner.
The novels I look at here span the final four decades of the century, a period in which scientific naturalism, and especially evolution, gained great authority. Giving Darwinian man a 'scientific cloak' undoubtedly had real effects for the position of women -as indeed it did for courtship plots. By the 1890s, for instance, New Woman novelists were bestsellers. In the hands of writers such as Sarah Grand courtship plots were made exemplary of the social responsibilities of middle-class women. As eugenic ideas began to find wider assent, romantic love was imagined as a rational process of mate-choosing, and courtship reconceived as central to stemming national biological deterioration. 16 At the same time, the tone of the novel became more urgent and didactic, in part as a response to this increasingly dogmatic scientific reductionism. One of the things we might expect, then, from bringing together Eliot and Schreiner, is a sense of the narrowing or hardening of available imaginative possibilities for women novelists engaged with scientific ideas. In this sense, Eliot's Middlemarch might be seen to represent the most fruitful moment in which deterministic science can be opened out by the novelist's skill.
But I bring Eliot and Schreiner together here to suggest that there are also important continuities across the period. Both writers explore sexual relations as a particularly sensitive barometer of ethical life, and both see ethics as fundamentally about relations and relationship. Relations, in this ethical model, cannot be fixed, and are subject to the endless transformations of perception, time and context. As active participants in the cultural assimilation of scientific ideas, as well as enthusiasts for the progressive potential of such ideas, Eliot and Schreiner nevertheless know that deterministic models of human well-being cannot work. In their fictions, the effects of determinism are deathly. Their writing also, in rather different ways, serves as a reminder of the persistence and continuity, especially within the developing languages of psychology, of older moral, ethical and religious contents. As we will see, these contents animate the new sciencesand courtship plots -in sometimes surprising ways, as part of the complex and often opaque processes of secularization. Stephen's bass, its 'deep "brum-brum" very pleasant to hear'. Maggie's beauty is intensified to onlookers as she is played on 'by the inexorable power of sound', making her 'strong for all enjoyment, weak for all resistance'. Philip feels that 'he had never before seen her under so strong an influence', and, as Stephen's song makes 'all the air in the room alive with a new influence', she 'was borne along by a wave too strong for her' (434-5).
Laws of Sexual Choosing in
Maggie will once again be borne along by the tide -before the final flood which brings her death. In place of Lucy's carefully contrived boat trip for Maggie and Philip, it is Stephen Guest who leads Maggie, with 'firm tender care', exerting his 'stronger presence that seemed to bear her along without any act of her own will', into the boat which he will then row, 'halfautomatically,' beyond the limits of Luckreth (where they were due to disembark), St Oggs and respectability (484). Maggie has no resistance, her 'languid energy' is absorbed by the happiness of being with him, as she gives herself over to his capable strength (488). The dream which brings her back to consciousness (and conscience) after a night spent together on the river, ushers in 'her own memory and her own dread' (491). In the long trial of her parting from Stephen, both 39 In one sense, indeed, Maggie is an exemplary evangelical subject precisely because she must constantly interrogate her motives and actions. According to evangelical doctrine, the outwardly good may be more imperilled, because complacent about the 'signs' of their external actions, than those who continually struggle with evidence of their sinfulness. These latter know that they need God. It is lack of faith which is the real danger, and the faithless who are condemned to hell. 40 
Huxley and Conscious Automata
Writing to her friend Barbara Bodichon Eliot confessed that, honest and brave though the account of evolution might be, explanations of 'how things come to be' produced in her only 'a feeble impression compared to the mystery that lies under the processes.' 45 By the 1870s, the mysteries of consciousness itself were being subjected to concerted scientific scrutiny and, while automatically in the organism', concluding that: 'We are conscious automata, endowed with free will in the only intelligible sense of that much-abused term -inasmuch as in many respects we are able to do as we like -but none the less we are parts of the great series of causes and effects which, in unbroken continuity, composes that which is, and has been, and shall be -the sum of existence.' 47 Thoughts and emotions, as much as sensations, are the result of physical processes in the brain which the conscious self expresses but does not motivate or control. Disputes about 'automatism' theory rumbled on through the remaining decades of the century, with important naturalist opponents such as William Carpenter. 48 William James, writing in The Principles of Psychology in 1890, argued that the 'automatists' fly in the face of both common sense ('common-sense… has the root and gist of the truth in her hands when she obstinately holds to it that feelings and ideas are causes') and of the fundamental principles of evolutionary selection: something as complex as consciousness could never have evolved if it did not advantage an organism.
Consciousness is undeniably useful, James asserts: 'But, if it is useful, it must be so through its causal efficaciousness'. 49 There were other objections too, from those who saw the machine-like body/brain imagined by the scientific naturalists as a chilling counterpart to Carlyle's lasting nightmare vision of modern man grown mechanical in head and heart. 50 These, usually religious, opponents railed against the 'eminent atomic, molecular chiefs' of the secular and scientific world. 51 Their anticipated accusations are the subject of the closing sections of Huxley's essay where he rehearses the charges of fatalism, materialism and atheism he anticipates will be levelled against him and dismisses them as unfounded. He goes so far as provocatively to assert that his thesis finds ample prior support in a major Protestant tradition: 'It is held, for example, in substance, by the whole school of predestinarian theologians, typified by St Augustine, Calvin, and Jonathan Edwards -the great work of the latter on the will showing in this, as in other cases, that the growth of physical science has introduced no new difficulty of principle into theological problems, but has merely given visible body, as it were, to those already existed.' 52 Huxley's claim deserves to be taken seriously. It is not only novelists whose accounts of the workings of human motivation are shaped by consciously abandoned religious belief. Adrian 'altogether corrupt in every power and faculty'; their desires are illimitable and must be subject to constant surveillance and discipline. The will of God is supreme, and 'our one rule of action in everything, great and small'. Thus, for Matthew Arnold, the puritan's goal is to construct 'a network of prescriptions to enwrap his whole life, to govern every moment of it, every impulse, every action'. 53 Modern ideas of freedom and individuality, of unrestricted liberties, are in this view cast as bondage to unfocused, unbounded and insatiable desires, producing a condition of restlessness and endless instability (the condition of original sin). 54 For Huxley, Calvinism lends affective authority to the evolutionary mind being imagined by the 1870s. It is not free, but a product of physiological law. Desmond describes it as belonging to a 'passionless cosmos reflected in an impersonal laboratory'. 55 
Determinism, Sexual Selection and Olive Schreiner
In the final part of this paper I turn to Olive Schreiner's literary negotiation of forms of determinism, both religious and scientific. I start earlier than is usual in looking at Schreiner Although it can conventionally be read as a narrative of the rejection of religious faith and turn to freethought -one of its framing debates is the predestinarian theology to which Huxley refersUndine is also a startling representation of automaton-like sexual constancy, in which the central protagonist's intellectual capacity simply dissolves when she falls in love. It is clearly an attempt by Schreiner to fictionalise her own conversion experience: including, centrally, the development of a thoroughgoing critique of evangelical (and Wesleyan) Christianity, but also, more fragmentarily, a critique of social power and, especially, the position of women. While the former is affectively vivid, however, and characterised as a shatteringly painful process of conflict and loss, the latter is peculiarly abstract and passionless. Undine may have discovered truth in ideas associated with secularising modernity, but that truth is a pale thing which seemingly cannot survive the force of falling in love. The problem of sexual selection, for the female protagonist, is not so much that desire gets the better of will, but that both appear programmed and unmodifiable.
Undine begins with an account of 'a queer little child', marginalised within a hybrid English and Dutch farming home in South Africa, and plagued by the sense of an inexorable and cruel God presiding over a world of overwhelming human misery. Undine's misery stems from the conflict she feels about the morality of a God who condemns the sinners he has created. Sent to her room with no dinner, for an outburst during Sunday study in which she asserts that the real lesson of Matthew 25 is 'That God has prepared a heaven for the people he means to save and a hell for the people he means to burn', Undine consoles herself by reading. 58 Edwards was a key figure in the New England revivalist movement of the late 1730s and the 1740s known as the Great Awakening, and responsible, in the 1754 Freedom of Will, for revitalising Calvinist tenets against Arminianism. 59 Named after the Dutch theologian Jacob Arminius, the latter was a set of protests against ultra-Calvinism begun in Holland in the early seventeenth century which were widely popular in the New England colonies. Arminianism sought to moderate the Calvinist doctrine of predestination, and especially the concept of supralapsarianism -the idea that the fall of man was always already a determined necessity, the result of a prior and positive decree by God. In particular, it sought to ground moral responsibilityand therefore the attribution of praise or blame -in the free will of the individual. Much of Edwards' work on the will was devoted to finding an argument which could establish that humans are responsible for their actions despite the fact that their fundamental goodness or sinfulness is ultimately the product of God's decree. 60 He makes use of a distinction between 'will' and 'person', asserting that the latter does indeed have the opportunity to act (and is therefore responsible for those actions); the notion of a self-originating will is, by contrast, incoherent because it must be presumed to be independent of any prior conditions of determination. A free act, according to Edwards, cannot be explained except by reference to another free act which precedes it, and so on into infinite regress. In fact, what actually exists instead of this nonsensical regress is human inclination towards good or evil which is entirely the product of God's will and decree. 61 Edwards thus effectively insists that religious determinism does not vitiate moral responsibility and can, on this score, be justified against its anti-Calvinist critics; just as, for Huxley, understanding humans as physiological machines, and consciousness as epiphenomenal, does not extinguish free will understood as the ability to 'in many respects do as we like.' 62 Undine reads carefully and slowly sections of the book which concern the moral conduct of Jesus Christ, as exhibited in his human nature. They argue for the inevitability of Christ's actions being holy and agreeable to God's will. Undine reads only a small amount, 'for each sentence was found so pregnant with profound and misty thoughts that she was obliged to read it carefully, and often re-read it, before it could be dismissed' (19) . The key passage is one in which Edwards argues that the salvation of all the saints from the beginning of the world, and the faith of the Old Testament patriarchs, is based on the redemption of the coming Messiah. Thus, if that (human) Messiah could fail, salvation has no firm foundation and all of Christianity collapses because built on uncertainty. 63 The human Christ is thus, inevitably, determined: his sin is impossible because foundational of the entire faith.
We have only minimal narrative guidance about how to interpret this act of reading. The narrator comments on the contrast between the child, full of life and vitality, and the 'great brown book' she is reading: 'the book so old, so dead, with the life thoughts of another generation petrified in its old yellow leaves, now probably being read for the last time' (19) . At one level, this allows us simply to read the episode as part of the development of Undine's freethought: in due Comtean manner, the phase of religious belief and the controversy with which it is associated, now old and dead, will be replaced by science and positive knowledge. The seemingly arcane debate about free will and determinism recedes as the lonely child discovers a new set of ideas -in the form of more books -that make her a freethinker. Though she has not yet found these new books, she is already on her way, her careful, thorough reading of Edwards' text showing her commitment to appropriately rigorous method in her pursuit of truth. We are given one further fragment of information about this scene, however, in which we are told that 'The book had belonged to [Undine's] own father, who, much to the grief of his father, had turned aside from the paths of truth and Arminianism, to the ways of Calvinism and error, and in those evil ways had died' (19) . Undine thus reads the book which stands for her father's heresy as she begins to formulate her own. Fleetingly, we are returned to the family drama which accompanies conversion, and reminded of its psychic costs. Undine's careful and thoughtful dismissal of what she reads cannot escape those costs; she cannot be rid of the dead book so easily. Its argument, about the fiction of free will or liberty and the reality of determinism, returns, transformed. As she grows up, the world is seemingly made more bearable for Undine by the new books she discoversespecially those of John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer. But, faced with shocking human loss she cannot make this reading answer to the problem of the afterlife. Thereafter, an unresolved determinism returns to the narrative, no longer as a question of religious faith and doubt, but in relation to the issue of sexual selection and sexual love -and it turns out to be every bit as punitive and morally repellent as Undine's experience of theology.
In the second chapter, Undine is 16 years old and living with her maternal grandparents in England where her brother dies by drowning, sending his fiancée mad with grief. Undine's own recovery from this event, staying with other relatives in an idealised rural England (Schreiner knew England only from books at this point), with Mill's and Spencer's books for companions, is only partial: 'The impression those days had made upon her, extinguishing all hope, all faith, all trust, had somewhat faded, but a strange deadness seemed to have settled down upon her; and, with an intellect vigorous and alive, it seemed as though all emotional vitality had died within her' (64) . Although she has developed a sharply feminist critique of the men she encounters, she nevertheless laments her own coldness and indifference, intuiting that only love can save her: 'If only I could love something, she thought, as she passed slowly over the wet grass. To love something, to believe in something, to worship something, even if that something were only herself -to look at something with eyes other than those of calm indifference -it would be worth sleepless nights of tears and prayer' (65) . She is soon to have her wish. The object of her love is Albert, the eldest son of the wealthy and repellent George Blair. The narrative, though, gives us precious little -almost nothing indeed -to support Undine's love for him: he is arrogant, cold, with 'disagreeable eyes', passing 'commonplace conventional remarks' on the paintings they view, and concerned that Undine conform to the dullest version of feminine propriety (68). All we have to make sense of what transpires is Undine's implied sexual desire that strips her of will, certainly, and also of intellect. Thus, meeting Albert Blair unexpectedly during a walk, and seeing him look askance at the book she has been reading -which is unidentified, but by implication is one of Undine's favoured volumes, such as Mill's Logic, provoking Blair to comment, 'Rather stiff reading, I should imagine' -she returns home and pulls out its pages, burning them one by one: '"I must be going mad," she said. "What makes me do this, and take such pleasure in doing it?"' (83).
Whatever the pleasure of Undine's love for Albert Blair, it cannot be integrated with her willed and independent reading and thought, or her nascent feminism. Instead, rejected by Blair (who marries a wealthy woman), she spirals through repulsive forms of sexual self-abnegation and into economic vulnerability on returning to South Africa and the Diamond Fields. 64 Here, as she makes a parlous living ironing, the notable emotional points of her existence conform to, and confirm, traditional feminine ideals of tenderness, nurturing, and self-sacrifice. Eventually, she discovers that Blair and his wife are nearby, but that he has succumbed to fever and died.
Stealing out at night-time to look at his body, she knows there is still 'no room for her' in 'those sternly folded arms', and cries out 'as of one whose last hope is past away' (228). Undine herself dies at dawn when, despite an atoning passage on the organic unity suggested to her by the stars, her last fleeting fantasy of Albert Blair's arms around her does little to suggest anything redemptive about her automata-like love for him. Instead, we are left with a final, disturbing, image of masculinity: 'Her white kappie lay near her and cast a grotesque shadow, like a man's face with long nose and chin…There was nothing else to be seen in the little yard' (235). Female sexual constancy has become a parody of itself as Undine's life is leeched away in her automatalike love for Albert Blair. The more mechanically she conforms to sacrificial femininity, the more grotesquely she is punished. Her rejection of Calvinistic doctrine, supposedly releasing her into 'freethought', instead remains as an ultra-determinism in relation to sexual choice. What
Undine cannot do, at any point, is to integrate her intellectual response with her emotional-sexual life.
The human automata supports an instinctual life which, in the Darwinian account, entrenches
Victorian feminine stereotypes. Between that and an ethical (evangelical) will that promulgates duty, late-Victorian women found their self-representation badly fractured, with intellect hived off, and at odds with avowedly feminine character. Intellect, the result in Darwin's account of the 'contest of rival males, and…success in the general struggle for life' (Descent, 630), is an adaptive by-product of being male. Punch's response to the birth of the 'New Woman' in the mid-1890s press was inevitable: intellect is the refuge of those women who lack the aesthetic qualities favoured by sexually selecting men. 65 Finding less trivial languages than these for their love plots proved a testing experience for women writers at the end of the nineteenth century, in relation to their emancipatory-minded protagonists. 66 It is little wonder that the idea of rational love associated with eugenics proved so appealing to many women as sexual selection began to be discussed as an issue of importance to whole populations, rather than merely to individuals and families. 67 Female virtue recast as eugenic virtue made love choices at the same time moral and the sign not of uncontrollable instinct but of rationally-exercised will. from her room at her parents' home on her marriage, houses her fossils and insects and microscope. Her small study adjoins the children's bedroom, so that she can attend to them if they awake; its books are mostly old, except for a handsomely leather bound copy of Darwin's 68 She is rather more eager than Darwin, though, to think from the natural to the social world.
Variation of Plants and Animals under Domestication.
Indeed, we quickly learn that Rebekah is an informed and passionate advocate of the new scientific view of the world. At the same time, she is its critic, countering the competitive and destructive existence described by social Darwinists with more Darwinism. Illustrating the social nature of the instincts, she recalls a scene in which a male baboon defends its troop of females and young from dogs that tear him to pieces, in a direct echo of the 'heroic little monkey' celebrated by Darwin at the end of the Descent. 69 We also learn that she is deeply unhappy: for what appears to be the domestic harmony represented by her home and its blooming garden actually disguises the torment and humiliation of marriage to a philandering man. Much of the novel's power lies in its complex compromises with the class and racial themes it raises, but my interest here is in the way it brings into view the processes and motivations of Rebekah's sexual passion for her husband, Frank -the intimate experiences of sexual selection -as well as her hard-won but nevertheless intelligent and feelingful decision to relinquish him, and her own love, and thereby establish her life on a new footing.
In the long letter Rebekah writes to her husband after discovering that he is having sex with her young coloured servant, she refers to the casual, day-to-day nature of his desire for other women, a desire which has its own automaton-like quality: 'you have often sat talking with women in the same room with me, bending perhaps over a young girl, plain it might be, with the same passionate light in your eyes begging for a return of sexual feeling, which you once turned on me; not caring that I was present to see, or the glances other women directed to me' (287). That passionate light -the force of the man's sexual desire, and the woman's response -is, Rebekah says, a lure-light, a decoy. It 'leads woman on to surrender and toil and bear for man… Oh, now, even now, when I know what it means, something in me cries out to see it once more, my light, for me, just once before I die!' (296). Nor is it the case, Rebekah insists, that she cannot imagine unmediated, instinctual desire: she 'can understand… a wave of black, primitive bestial desire surging up at some moment in life in a nature otherwise pure and lofty' (287). But to be dominated by such desire is to be blighted: it would be like a land 'that always trembled, that was never still, when from every smallest crack the foetid fume rose, and a fine, almost imperceptible, fall of ashes covered it: the very dogs would leave it -no man would live there!' (288) In other words, there is something automaton-like about sexuality -the demands of the species depend on it. But for human beings sociality is their condition, it is the fabric of the environment in which they exist and evolve -there must be an expansive affective life for there to be human and social flourishing. Human evolution, Rebekah insists, is 'love and the expansion of ego to others' (209). Nor could this, for Schreiner, ever be answered by the fantasy of making sexual selection rational, or the simplifications of imagining replacing romantic or passionate love with love for the race. 70 The restitution or crafting of Rebekah's agency must be done by folding back into her account of the world elements of the evolutionary script she also criticises and rejects. It is this capacity for in it latent, other, and even higher forms, of creative energy and life-dispensing power, and that its history on earth has only begun. As the first wild rose when it hung from its stem with its centre of stamens and pistils and its single whorl of pale petals, had only begun its course, and was destined, as the ages passed, to develop stamen upon stamen and petal upon petal, till it assumed a hundred forms of joy and beauty. 73 Word count: 9318 (11,355 incl endnotes)
